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Abstract 
 
Conventional wisdom suggests that the generous provision of UI in Europe can account for 
the low regional mobility rates. Emphasizing the disincentive effect, this hypothesis ignores 
that UI might have also a positive effect, by relaxing liquidity constraints in the presence of 
mobility and search costs. The paper investigates empirically the effect of UI on geographic 
labour mobility for 5 European countries. Overall, the findings suggest that receiving benefits 
is not associated with lower mobility, and they indicate that the effects might vary depending 
on the institutional characteristics and the incentive structure of the UI system of each 
country. 
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 1. Introduction 
In the process of European economic and monetary integration, geographic labour mobility 
has increased its importance as a mechanism to absorb regional shocks. This is the case 
because policy instruments such as inflation differentials and exchange rate realignments are 
not available for adjustment of shocks in a monetary union. Attaining higher geographic 
mobility is also considered as one of the ways to achieve the objective of full employment in 
Europe, as set out at the "Lisbon Strategy" (European Commission, 2001). 
Despite the increased importance of geographic labour mobility, it is a stylised fact 
that regional mobility rates within European countries are low. In particular, internal mobility 
rates in 1995 measuring the ratio of gross flows to population were about 0.6 per cent in 
Spain, 1.2 per cent in Germany, 1.5 per cent in France, while they were much higher, around 
2.4 per cent, in the U.K. and the U.S. (OECD, 2000). Adjustment to regional shocks in 
Europe has been mainly achieved through changes of unemployment and participation rates 
and less through geographic mobility (Decressin and Fatas, 1995; Jimeno and Bentolila, 
1998). In contrast, in the U.S., regional labour mobility accounts for a large part of regional 
adjustment to regional shocks (Blanchard and Katz, 1992).  
Although the low mobility of workers across European countries can be attributed to 
cultural and linguistic differences, these differences are not able to explain the low regional 
mobility rates within countries. Alternative explanations are focusing on institutional 
characteristics, which is believed they reduce the incentives to move (e.g., Bertola and Ichino, 
1995). These characteristics are typically linked to the Unemployment Insurance (UI) system, 
wage coordination and employment protection legislation (see also Bertola, 1999). The 
generosity of the UI system, in particular, has been argued that can explain the low regional 
mobility in Europe, as insured workers have a lower incentive to move to regain employment 
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(Hassler, Mora, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2005).  
The hypothesis that unemployment insurance deters mobility and that its generosity 
can account for the low regional mobility in Europe is a priori ambiguous and has not been 
established empirically. On the one hand, generous UI might lead to stronger geographic 
attachment as the opportunity cost of rejecting a job offer is lower, the unemployed adjust 
their reservation wages more slowly and exert less search effort. On the other hand, generous 
UI can relax liquidity constraints with a positive effect on mobility, in the presence of 
mobility and search costs. The purpose of this paper is to investigate empirically the extent to 
which UI affects geographic labour mobility in Europe employing individual data from the 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom (U.K.). The analysis is based on binary choice models taking into 
account individual unobserved heterogeneity. To address the endogeneity of UI receipt with 
unobserved characteristics both correlated random effects and fixed effects models are 
estimated, which differ in their assumptions about the correlation of the unobserved effect 
with the individual observed characteristics. 
Previous literature has mainly focused on the relation between labour market status 
and geographic mobility showing that the unemployed are more likely to move in comparison 
to the employed (see Da Vanzo (1978) for the U.S., Pissarides and Wadsworth (1989) for the 
U.K., Antolin and Bover (1997) for Spain, and reviews of the literature on Greenwood, 1997 
and Herzog, Schlottmann, Boehm, 1993). However, there is no evidence based on micro data 
on the effect of UI receipt on the probability to move to obtain employment. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2, discusses the theoretical 
framework, while Section 3 describes the data. The econometric methodology is presented in 
Section 4, and the results of the empirical analysis in Section 5. Finally, the paper concludes 
with a summary of the findings. 
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 2. Theoretical Framework 
The standard result from the theory of job search suggests that UI reduces the search effort 
exerted by benefit recipients and increases their reservation wages, lowering the probability to 
find and accept a job (Lippman and McCall, 1979; Mortensen, 1977). This disincentive effect 
of UI has been also considered to affect geographic mobility through the stronger geographic 
attachment that the lower employment prospects might create. Hassler, Mora, Storesletten and 
Zilibotti (2005), argue that the variation in the UI generosity between Europe and the U.S. is 
able to explain the differences in the mobility rates, with Europe being characterised by more 
generous benefits and lower mobility.  
However, theoretical arguments have been developed questioning the conventional 
wisdom regarding the disincentive effects of UI. These arguments suggest that, by relaxing 
liquidity constraints, the increased expenditures allowed when receiving benefits may increase 
the productivity of the search process (e.g. Barron and Mellow, 1979; Tannery, 1983; Ben-
Horim and Zuckerman, 1987). This can enhance employment opportunities at the local, but 
more importantly at the national level, where search costs are higher. In a standard framework 
in which the decision to move depends on comparing the expected utility gains by moving 
with mobility costs, the effect of UI is ambiguous. On the one hand, benefits reduce the 
opportunity cost of rejecting a job offer, which makes the unemployed rejecting more often by 
choosing a higher reservation wage. On the other hand, higher benefits relax the liquidity 
constraints, which impede mobility, making recipients more likely to accept a job offer which 
requires a move.  
In the macro literature, liquidity constraints in the presence of imperfect financial 
markets can affect the mobility choice as the incurred mobility costs translate directly into 
lower consumption (Bertola, Foellmi and Zweimüller, 2006). If marginal utility is declining, 
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then current consumption is more valued than the future gains from higher wages; hence the 
worker will move less than with complete capital markets. Intuitively, larger wage gains are 
required to trigger forward-looking mobility decisions by workers who finance mobility out 
of current consumption. Therefore, receiving UI and being able to smooth consumption and 
finance mobility costs might be seen as a way to correct financial market imperfections, and 
thus, being beneficial for mobility in the presence of liquidity constraints. 
The direction for the effect of other individual characteristics on the decision to move 
is based on established hypotheses in the literature. That is, more educated workers are 
expected to exhibit higher mobility due to the different costs they face in their mobility 
decision as a result of higher general skills, adaptability and possibly previous experience of 
mobility (Wasmer, Fredriksson, Lamo, Messina, Peri, 2006). Older workers are considered to 
be less likely to move as they face a shorter time horizon in which they can benefit from the 
labour market opportunities in the destination region (Goss and Paul, 1986). Family and social 
ties also increase mobility costs lowering mobility probabilities (Spilimbergo and Ubeda, 
2004; Belot and Ermisch, 2006). Finally, home ownership is associated with transaction costs, 
which lowers the likelihood to move (Hughes and McCormick, 1981; Henley, 1998). 
 
3. Data 
The empirical analysis is based on individual data from the eight waves of the ECHP for the 
years 1994-2001. The ECHP is a survey based on a standardised questionnaire that involves 
annual interviewing of a representative panel of households and individuals in each country 
covering a wide range of topics: demographics, employment characteristics, housing, 
education, income, etc. In the first wave, a sample of some 60,500 nationally represented 
households - approximately 130,000 adults aged 16 years and over - were interviewed in the 
then 12 Member States. There are three features that make the ECHP relevant for this study. 
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Namely, the simultaneous coverage of employment status and housing situation, the 
standardised methodology and procedures yielding comparable information across countries 
and the longitudinal design in which information on the same set of households and persons is 
gathered. The advantage of using the ECHP, in addition to providing longitudinal data, is that 
individuals, who move, form or join new households, are followed up at their new location 
within the country. These features allow a European cross-country comparative study of 
geographic mobility. 
The information on geographic mobility is based on the questions in the survey about 
the year and the month of moving in the current address, and the geography of the move. That 
is, whether it is a move to the current address from another place within the locality or area, or 
a move from another area of the country. Due to the low inter-regional mobility observed in 
most European countries, both intra and inter-regional moves are considered in this study. 
However, both types of move can be related to different reasons, such as housing, personal, or 
job related reasons. Given the focus of the paper on geographic labour mobility, a clear 
distinction is made between these different reasons by defining a mover as an individual who 
has moved within or outside his/her locality or area starting a new job. The dependent 
variable is therefore binary, taking the value of 1 if an individual has moved obtaining a new 
job within the year between two consecutive waves, and 0, otherwise. It is also important to 
distinguish between the causes and the consequences of a move. Being unemployed or 
married may result in a change of residence, but can also be the consequence of a change of 
residence. Therefore, the information for the explanatory variables is obtained from the wave 
preceding the year of the move. 
The sample consists of individuals who are labour force participants aged 20-64. 
Participants are considered to be those who are either employed or not employed, but they are 
looking for a job. The countries studied are Denmark, France, Germany, Spain, and the 
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United Kingdom. The choice of countries is based on availability of sufficient regional 
mobility and on differences in the rules regarding UI provision. Due to low regional mobility 
rates in Europe, extending the econometric analysis to other countries in the ECHP was not 
possible. A description of the features of the UI system in each of these countries is provided 
in the Appendix. 
Table 1 contains the descriptive statistics of the sample. Regarding the labour market 
status, individuals in Spain exhibit the highest unemployment rate, 20.9 per cent, and those in 
the U.K. the lowest, 5.5 per cent. Moreover, among the unemployed the share of recipients 
varies from 77.5 per cent in Denmark, 59.3 per cent in Germany and 55.6 per cent in France, 
to 29.7 per cent in the U.K. and 22.8 per cent in Spain. This variation of benefits receipt is due 
to the various eligibility criteria that apply to each country. Education varies also across 
countries, with Spain having the highest share of low educated, while Denmark and the U.K. 
have the highest share of individuals completed higher education. Home ownership reflects 
the situation in the housing market of each country, with Spain and the U.K. having the 
highest ownership rates, while Germany has the highest share in the rental market. 
[Insert table 1 here] 
Table 2 shows mobility rates by country. Columns (1), (3), and (4), are constructed 
using the ECHP for different definitions of mobility, while Column (2), shows the gross flows 
of regional mobility for each country using data from the OECD (2000). The two sources of 
mobility rates are not perfectly comparable since they are based on different definitions and 
refer to different years in some cases. Nevertheless, it appears that the mobility rates obtained 
from the ECHP follow the same pattern with the aggregate flow data in Column (2). That is, 
mobility rates are lower in Spain, with Denmark and the U.K. exhibiting the highest mobility 
rates. However, as discussed above, due to the low inter-regional mobility rates experienced 
by these countries, the empirical analysis is focused on both intra and inter-regional moves 
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conditional on having started a new job, as they appear in Column (4). 
[Insert table 2 here] 
Table 3 presents the mobility rates by country and by individual characteristics. In all 
countries, the unemployed exhibit higher mobility rates relative to the employed. Within the 
unemployed, mobility rates for recipients are higher relative to the non-recipients in France, 
Germany, and Spain, they are about the same in Denmark, and they are lower in the U.K. 
Regarding the other individual characteristics, younger and higher educated exhibit higher 
mobility rates, while married, those having children and the home owners have lower mobility 
rates. Finally, mobility rates do not seem to differ between males and females. 
[Insert table 3 here] 
These patterns are in line with the expected effect of individual characteristics on 
mobility rates as discussed in section 2. Interestingly, if anything, the recipients exhibit higher 
mobility rates compared to the non-recipients, even in countries in which traditionally the UI 
system is considered to be relatively generous such as, in Germany. However, individuals 
differ in many respects which might be correlated with the unemployment status and benefit 
receipt. Therefore, any conclusions can only be drawn after estimating a properly specified 
econometric model, which takes into account both the observed and the unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. 
 
4. Empirical Methodology 
The econometric model is a discrete choice model in which the dependent variable  is 
binary, where   refers to the individual and 
ity
{1, 2,... }i = N T{1, 2... }t =  refers to the year. 
Assuming the existence of an underlying response variable ity
∗  the decision rule can be 
specified as 
(it it ity I X uβ∗ 0)= + ≥      (1) 
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where itX  is the vector of individual and household characteristics, and β  is a vector of 
unknown parameters to be estimated. The unobserved term  is decomposed into a time-
invariant term, , and a time-variant term 
itu
ic itε . 
In practice,   is unobserved. What is observed is a dummy variable    which 
equals to 1 whenever   , and to zero, otherwise. The latent variable    can be thought 
as the expected gain from moving in order to obtain a new job during the time period  
 compared to not moving. When the expected gain is positive then a move is 
observed, so that, . 
ity
∗
ity
0ity
∗ ≥ ity∗
[ 1,  t − ]t
1ity =
In general, one might suspect that  is not independent of whether an unemployed 
receives benefits or not. Since in most cases the benefits receipt depends on the length of the 
previous employment experience, it might be the case that workers with higher attachment to 
the labour market are also more likely to be recipients. To address this endogeneity issue two 
different models are estimated, which differ in their assumptions about the correlation of the 
unobserved effect    with the individual characteristics.   
c
ic
The first model assumes that the time-variant term itε  is iid normal and that itX  is 
strictly exogenous with respect to this unobservable (conditional on ). Following 
Chamberlain (1980), the time-invariant term  is allowed to be correlated with some 
elements of 
ic
ic
itX by assuming that it follows a conditional normal distribution with linear 
expectation and a constant variance (Correlated Random Effects). A Mundlak (1978) version 
of this model assumes that  |i itc X ∼   Normal ( 2,iX )αψ ξ σ+ , where  iX   is the average of  
itX  , with , and 1,...t = T 2ασ   is the variance of  iα   in the equation 
i ic X iψ ξ α= + +       (2) 
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In the second model, assuming that the unobserved individual characteristics are fixed 
for each individual, conditioning on a minimum sufficient statistic such as, the sum of the 
outcomes of , it is possible to obtain a consistent estimator for ity β  without any assumptions 
about how    is related to  ic itX   (Conditional Fixed Effects). If the probability to move, given 
the observed and unobserved characteristics, follows a logistic distribution then conditioning 
the likelihood of a sequence of moves for an individual on the total number of periods that the 
individual has moved results in eliminating  .  The panel logit model is given by  ic
Pr( 1| , )
1
i it
i it
c X
it it i c X
ey X c
e
β
β
+
+= = +     (3) 
In this case the sum of the number of ‘1’ outcomes for an individual is a sufficient statistic for 
. For example, if T=2, then the probability of observing the sequence (1,0) is given by ic
'
2 1
0 1 0 1 ( )
1Pr( 1, 0 | 1, , )
1 i i
i i i i it i X X
y y y y X c
e β−
= = + = = +   (4) 
Maximising this conditional version of the likelihood function using the subset of 
observations where  provides with unbiased and consistent estimates of  0 1 1i iy y+ = β  
(Chamberlain, 1980). In an analogous to the linear first difference estimator, the CFE 
estimator uses the differences in the values of X over time to identify the probability of 
observing the sequence (1,0) versus (0,1). Note that observations such that 0iy y 1i=  are 
uninformative for β  since they can be rationalized by any values of  even though the ic X ’s 
are changing. Since the identification of the parameter vector is based on changes over time of 
the characteristics, the CFE model can identify only time-varying covariates. Also, the 
estimation is based on the sub-sample of those individuals who experience a move within the 
panel, which results in a reduction of the sample size. Similarly with the CRE model, the 
time-variant term itε  is assumed to be independent of the covariates.  
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5. Results 
Both Correlated Random Effects (CRE) and Conditional Fixed Effects (CFE) models are 
estimated separately for each country for the total sample and by sex. Estimation performed 
on the pooled country sample imposes restrictions to the coefficients which are rejected based 
on a standard likelihood-ratio test. For both models, the specification includes two dummies 
which distinguish the unemployed to benefit recipients and non-recipients. Other regressors 
include individual and household characteristics, such as age, sex, the level of education 
based on the (ISCED) classification, the type of housing tenure, a dummy for being married, 
and the number of children. Regional and wide economic effects are captured by including 
year and regional dummies and the regional unemployment rate. A detailed description of the 
variables can be found in Table A2. 
 
5.1 Correlated Random Effects 
Table 4 presents the coefficients estimates from the CRE model for the total sample of labour 
market participants, which consists of the employed and the unemployed looking for a job. 
The results suggest that the unemployed who are non-recipients of benefits are more likely to 
move for a new job compared to the reference group of employed. This effect is significant in 
all the countries considered in the study. The effect for recipients appears to be also positive 
and significant for Denmark, France and Spain, while it is not significantly different from 
zero for Germany and the U.K. Similar results are obtained when estimating the model 
separately for males and females in Table 5. The results for the other individual characteristics 
suggest that those with higher education, who are younger, not married, and live in a rented 
accommodation, are more likely to move. These findings are in line with the existing 
literature on the determinants of geographic mobility and the hypothesis outlined in section 2. 
[Insert table 4 here] 
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The specification in Tables 4 and 5 allows the individual time-varying characteristics 
to be correlated with the unobserved term as specified in section 4. For instance, receiving 
benefits might be associated with individual characteristics which are unobserved such as, 
labour market attachment, which renders benefit receipt to be endogenous. Controlling for 
such correlation by the inclusion of the mean values of these characteristics, relaxes the 
assumption of exogeneity of benefits with respect to these unobserved individual effects. The 
coefficients of the mean values of these characteristics suggest a significant correlation in 
some cases. In relation to benefits, in particular, recipients in Germany are associated with a 
positive effect on mobility, while non-recipients are less likely to move with a larger effect for 
the U.K. In all cases, conditional on the observed characteristics, the variance of the 
unobserved effect is significant suggesting the presence of individual characteristics, which 
are persistent over time affecting the decision to move. 
[Insert table 5 here] 
5.2 Conditional Fixed Effects 
Relaxing the imposed parametric assumptions of the CRE model on the way the unobserved 
individual effect is related to the observed individual characteristics, the estimates of the CFE 
model in Table 6 show results which are similar with the CRE model. Both recipients and 
non-recipients are significantly more likely to move compared to the employed, except for the 
recipients in Germany and the U.K. where the effect is not significant. Also, the estimates of 
the CFE model by sex, in Table 7, show that there are no significant gender differences. The 
similarity of the results across the two models indicates the importance of considering the 
CRE model instead of a standard random effect model in this analysis. The advantage of the 
CRE model is that time invariant characteristics can be identified and it does not require to 
condition on a statistic, which leads to a reduction in the sample size. 
[Insert table 6 here] 
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[Insert table 7 here] 
 
5.3 Unemployed Sample 
So far the analysis was based on a sample including both the unemployed and employed 
workers imposing the restriction of a common effect of individual characteristics for both 
groups. Moreover, such effects are more likely to be identified through the employed group. 
Considering a sample which consists of only the unemployed, it is possible to relax these 
assumptions and directly test the effect of receiving benefits on the probability to move for a 
new job. Table 8 shows that, in the sample of unemployed, recipients are significantly more 
likely to move compared to non-recipients in Denmark, France and Spain, while the effect is 
not significantly different from zero for the recipients in Germany and the U.K. These results 
are based on the CRE model on the pooled sample of males and females. Due to limited 
sample sizes, a distinction by sex is not allowed by the data in all cases and estimating a CFE 
model is not feasible. However, the male dummy for all the countries is not significant. Also, 
based on the similarity of the results for the total sample of employed and unemployed 
between the CRE and the CFE models in Tables 4 and 6, relying only on estimates from the 
CRE model provides convincing evidence. 
[Insert table 8 here] 
5.4 Predicted Probabilities 
To obtain a size of the effect of benefits on the likelihood to move, the predicted probabilities 
are computed based on the estimates from the CRE model and they are presented in Table 9.  
The first row refers to the predicted probability for an individual based on the total sample of 
employed and unemployed, setting the individual characteristics at their mean value. The 
second row computes the predicted probability for the average individual for the sample of 
unemployed. Since the model includes a number of dummy variables and the mean values are 
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not very intuitive, the predicted probabilities are also obtained for a reference person. The 
reference person is defined as a non-recipient, 30-45 years old, with secondary education, 
married with average number of kids who lives in a rented house. The predicted probabilities 
for the average individual are ordered similarly with the raw data in Table 2, except for the 
U.K., in which possibly due to the small sample size the predicted probabilities are relatively 
low. The last part of Table 9 shows that in all countries recipients exhibit higher mobility rates 
compared to non-recipients with the difference being larger for Denmark and France, 
followed by Spain.  
[Insert table 9 here] 
5.5 Discussion 
Overall, the findings suggest that receiving benefits is not associated with lower mobility. 
They also indicate that the effect might vary depending on the institutional characteristics of 
each country. In countries with relatively generous benefits such as Denmark, France and to 
some extent Spain, the effect of receiving benefits on the probability to move is positive and 
significant. For the U.K., which provides the least generous benefits, the effect although it is 
positive is nonetheless not significant. The link between the generosity of UI and labour 
market outcomes for the unemployed is also indicated by Tatsiramos (2006) looking at the 
effect of UI receipt on subsequent employment stability.  
Related work by Ahn, dela Rica, Ugidos (1999) on the willingness to move for work 
in Spain, finds no significant difference on migration willingness between recipients and non-
recipients. Pedersen and Smith (2002), for Denmark, find an insignificant negative effect of 
the net compensation rate in unemployment on the willingness to move. However these 
findings do not rely on actual migration choice. Goss and Paul (1990), using information on 
unemployment benefits and actual individual migration for a sample of heads of households 
from the PSID for the U.S., they also do not find a significantly different effect between 
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recipients and non-recipients on the probability to move. 
To interpret the results and the observed differences across countries, it is important to 
note that the generosity of the benefits does not only matter for the recipients, but has an 
indirect effect on the non-recipients through the entitlement effect (Mortensen, 1977). That is, 
in countries in which UI is relatively generous, non-recipients will have an incentive to find a 
job so that they will become eligible for benefits upon future job separation. This will also 
have an effect on geographic mobility decisions of non-recipients and the effect will be larger 
the less tight are the eligibility criteria. Another dimension which is important is the incentive 
structure of the UI system. In France, for instance, there is a decline of benefits at every 4 
months of remaining in unemployment. This might increase the incentives to find a job for the 
recipients, but might also reduce the entitlement effect for non-recipients. Another important 
dimension is related to the strictness of search effort requirements imposed by the UI system. 
The lack of such incentive structure in Germany might be able to explain the insignificant 
effect of receiving benefits, as the moral hazard effect might be higher for recipient, so that 
they are less likely to find a job. On the other hand, the entitlement effect for non-recipients 
will be also higher, which might increase their job finding rates and consequently their 
mobility rates. Finally, the extent to which UI raises moral hazard issues might vary across 
countries depending on the degree of public-spiritedness (Algan and Cahuc, 2006). For 
instance, the positive effect for recipients in Denmark, despite the very generous replacement 
rates, might be related to the attitudes of individuals towards the government and the public 
systems. 
 
Conclusion 
Conventional wisdom suggests that the generous provision of UI in Europe can account for 
the low regional mobility rates, emphasizing the disincentive effect of UI. However, focusing 
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only on the lower incentives to move for regaining employment, which is induced by UI, 
ignores the hypothesis that UI might also have a positive effect on mobility by relaxing 
liquidity constraints in the presence of mobility and search costs. This paper investigates 
empirically this theoretical ambiguity and contributes to the scarce evidence of the effect of 
unemployment benefits on actual geographic labour mobility in Europe.  
The analysis is based on individual data from the ECHP for Denmark, France, 
Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom, estimating binary choice models which take into 
account individual unobserved heterogeneity. The findings suggest that receiving benefits is 
not associated with lower mobility, and they indicate that the effects might vary depending on 
the institutional characteristics of each country. That is, in countries with relatively generous 
benefits such as Denmark, France and to some extent Spain, recipients of UI are significantly 
more likely to move compared to non-recipients. In countries which provide less generous 
benefits such as the U.K., or generous but with a relatively weak incentive structure, such as 
Germany, recipients do not differ significantly on their likelihood to move. To address the 
endogeneity of UI receipt both correlated random effects and fixed effects models are 
estimated, which differ in their assumptions about the correlation of the unobserved effect 
with the individual characteristics. The results are robust to these different model 
specifications across countries. 
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Appendix 
The Unemployment Insurance System 
Table A1 shows the main characteristics of the UI system in each country. There are mainly 
two schemes of unemployment benefits, unemployment insurance, and unemployment 
assistance. Unemployment insurance is the main scheme under which those who are eligible 
receive compensation in the event of entry into unemployment. Eligibility is based upon 
previous employment and contribution histories, which implies that it does not cover all the 
unemployed. Unemployment assistance is not available in all countries. It is generally means 
tested and it is usually available for those who exhaust unemployment insurance and those 
who are not eligible. No distinction is made between unemployment insurance and assistance 
as such information is not available in the data. Following Bertola, Jimeno, Marimon and 
Pissarides (2000), the European countries can be classified as follows: 1) the Nordic 
(Denmark) and the Continental countries (France, and Germany) which provide generous 
benefits, 2) the Anglo-Saxon countries (e.g. United Kingdom) which provide flat rate 
payments with relatively short duration, and 3) the southern European countries (e.g. Greece, 
Italy, and Spain) which have welfare states that were developed recently and provide limited 
unemployment insurance, although Spain resembles more to the Continental countries. 
In particular, for the U.K., the flat rate corresponds to a replacement rate of about 30 per 
cent, which is about half to one-third of the replacement rate in France, Germany, and Spain.  
Duration of UI varies by employment record (France, Germany and Spain), and/or by age 
(France and Germany). France has the highest UI benefit duration (up to 60 months) but the 
payment is decreasing at every 4 months period, while Denmark has the highest replacement 
rate, 90 per cent, of the reference earnings. 
 
 
[Insert table A1 here] 
 
[Insert table A2 here] 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics by Country
Denmark France Germany Spain U.K.
Labour Market Status
   Employed 0.919 0.913 0.842 0.791 0.945
   Unemployed 0.081 0.087 0.158 0.209 0.055
     Share of Unemployed - Recipients 0.775 0.444 0.407 0.228 0.297
     Share of Unemployed - Non-Recipients 0.225 0.556 0.593 0.772 0.703
Mean Age 40.68 39.95 39.10 37.99 38.74
Education
   Third Level 0.390 0.262 0.219 0.229 0.385
   2nd Level of Secondary 0.406 0.445 0.575 0.210 0.150
   Less than 2nd Level 0.204 0.293 0.206 0.561 0.464
Married 0.602 0.650 0.683 0.640 0.612
Number of Children 0.814 0.901 0.760 0.742 0.706
Home Owner 0.765 0.604 0.404 0.823 0.798
Male 0.523 0.546 0.539 0.617 0.532
Sample Size 15,685 32,438 41,411 36,702 27,326
Source: ECHP (1994-2001), Author's calculations. 
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Table 2. Mobility rates by country (various definitions)
Inter-regional Gross flows Inter-regional Inter&Intra-regional
with new job with new job
Denmark 2.00 (313) - 0.56  (88) 1.59 (250)
France 1.44 (468) 1.49  0.31 (101) 0.85 (275)
Germany 0.64 (265) 1.24 0.18  (75) 1.09 (452)
Spain 0.40 (148) 0.60 0.12  (43) 0.82 (300)
United Kingdom 3.38 (924) 2.30  0.76 (208) 1.97 (539)  
Notes:  Intra and Inter-regional mobiltiy rates are averages calculated from ECHP.  Gros flows refer to the 
ratio of gross flows to population (1995 for France and Italy, 1993 for Germany, 1994 for Spain, and 1998 for 
the UK) obtained from Table 2.12, OECD (2002). 
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Table 3. Mobility rates by country and characteristics
Denmark France Germany Spain U.K.
Labour Market Status
   Employed 1.20 0.72 0.97 0.65 1.91
   Unemployed 3.78 2.20 1.72 1.45 3.07
     Unemployed - Recipients 3.76 2.56 1.87 1.66 2.69
     Unemployed - Non-Recipients 3.86 1.92 1.62 1.38 3.23
Age Group 20-24 6.82 4.49 2.78 1.59 6.49
Age Group 25-29 3.72 2.12 2.14 1.83 3.52
Age Group 30-44 1.48 0.64 0.97 0.68 1.44
Age Group 45-54 0.38 0.14 0.50 0.20 0.56
Age Group 55-64 0.17 0.04 0.16 0.06 0.27
Education
   Third Level 1.19 1.36 0.82 0.81 2.28
   2nd Level of Secondary 1.89 0.69 1.18 0.87 2.94
   Less than 2nd Level 1.78 0.62 1.14 0.80 1.40
Married 0.72 0.44 0.65 0.46 1.05
Non-Married 2.92 1.61 2.04 1.45 3.43
With Children 1.33 0.70 0.96 0.69 1.59
Without Children 1.82 1.01 1.21 0.93 2.24
Home Owner 0.88 0.43 0.37 0.59 1.39
Renter 3.93 1.48 1.58 1.88 4.28
Male 1.62 0.85 1.11 0.82 2.04
Female 1.56 0.84 1.06 0.81 1.90
Source: ECHP (1994-2001), Author's calculations. 
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Table 4. Random Effect Probit Estimates
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Labor Market Status
Unemployed
   With Benefits 0.635 0.142 0.463 0.133 0.021 0.099 0.470 0.122 0.006 0.192
   Without Benefits 0.441 0.232 0.327 0.132 0.297 0.100 0.295 0.087 0.306 0.139
Education
   High Education 0.092 0.092 0.305 0.072 0.193 0.075 -0.016 0.064 0.271 0.051
   Medium Education 0.076 0.082 -0.023 0.069 0.141 0.057 -0.110 0.063 0.260 0.063
Age Groups
   Age 20-24 1.137 0.131 1.192 0.117 0.622 0.084 0.710 0.110 1.022 0.084
   Age 25-29 0.807 0.118 0.835 0.107 0.506 0.073 0.813 0.103 0.740 0.081
   Age 30-44 0.583 0.107 0.508 0.102 0.269 0.067 0.489 0.097 0.443 0.075
Male 0.017 0.063 0.107 0.053 0.078 0.043 0.121 0.052 0.023 0.044
Family Characteristics
   Married -0.140 0.154 -0.215 0.139 0.090 0.109 -0.978 0.136 -0.142 0.110
   No. of Kids -0.096 0.085 -0.033 0.070 -0.064 0.061 -0.039 0.070 0.033 0.061
Home Owner -0.532 0.120 0.262 0.111 -0.295 0.114 -0.207 0.098 -0.147 0.090
Reg. Un Rate 0.023 0.040 -0.046 0.027 -0.032 0.013 0.011 0.017 -0.001 0.009
Mean Un w. Benefits -0.662 0.258 -0.112 0.234 0.511 0.150 -0.160 0.248 0.046 0.351
Mean Un w/o Benefits -0.664 0.536 -0.415 0.233 -0.286 0.159 -0.222 0.139 -1.113 0.333
Mean Married -0.057 0.176 0.116 0.150 -0.434 0.122 0.781 0.145 -0.007 0.122
Mean No. of Kids 0.065 0.092 0.005 0.076 0.092 0.066 0.049 0.075 -0.086 0.067
Mean Home Owner 0.130 0.143 -0.736 0.130 -0.251 0.125 -0.334 0.117 -0.409 0.108
Constant -2.733 0.272 -2.609 0.304 -2.498 0.160 -2.859 0.282 -3.592 0.227
Sigma 0.414 0.090 0.275 0.112 0.405 0.063 0.313 0.109 0.355 0.068
Observations
Groups
Log-Likelihood
U.K.
27326
6624
-2,150.04
Germany Spain
41411
9840
36702
10409
-2,257.11 -1,549.21
Denmark France
15,685
4,101
-1,109.92
32438
7715
-1,347.52
Notes: Estimations are performed for each country separately including regional and year dummies. The mean values are 
defined for the time-varying covariates. 
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Table 5. Random Effect Probit Estimates by Sex
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Labor Market Status
Unemployed
   With Benefits 0.487 0.225 0.429 0.218 -0.123 0.133 0.405 0.143 0.059 0.226
   Without Benefits 0.972 0.395 0.354 0.236 0.246 0.146 0.232 0.125 0.463 0.189
Sigma 0.473 0.110 0.453 0.108 0.307 0.105 0.236 0.065 0.359 0.093
Observations
Groups
Log-Likelihood
Labor Market Status
Unemployed
   With Benefits 0.757 0.186 0.534 0.176 0.210 0.153 0.682 0.236 -0.089 0.378
   Without Benefits 0.172 0.311 0.366 0.165 0.345 0.140 0.397 0.130 0.162 0.214
Sigma 0.309 0.163 0.218 0.032 0.491 0.075 0.450 0.143 0.348 0.102
Observations
Groups
Log-Likelihood
12795
3262
-957.92
3362
-1,180.63
FEMALE
4428
7483 14741 19073
U.K.
14531
MALE
-520.89 -586.14 -998.08 -572.03
1995 3606 4713
14050
-577.72 -744.95 -1,246.45 -963.21
22338
5127
22652
5981
8202
2106
17697
4109
Denmark France Germany Spain
Notes: Estimations are performed for each country separately by sex including regional and year dummies. The estimates 
for the other covariates are not reported. 
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Table 6. Conditional Fixed Effect Logit Estimates
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Labor Market Status
Unemployed
   With Benefits 1.048 0.275 0.946 0.269 0.010 0.203 0.968 0.271 -0.162 0.402
   Without Benefits 0.867 0.419 0.906 0.191 0.489 0.197 0.851 0.185 0.525 0.262
Age 0.274 0.219 0.328 0.150 0.046 0.123 0.809 0.177 -0.534 0.117
Age^2/100 -0.192 0.272 -0.554 0.252 -0.193 0.182 -1.075 0.268 0.154 0.178
Family Characteristics
   Married -0.214 0.307 -0.851 0.262 0.080 0.217 -1.891 0.294 -0.122 0.196
   No. of Kids -0.132 0.179 -0.177 0.126 -0.132 0.128 -0.317 0.165 0.005 0.106
Home Owner -0.809 0.201 0.572 0.170 -0.370 0.217 -0.138 0.176 -0.240 0.140
Reg. Un Rate 0.077 0.108 -0.031 0.038 -0.003 0.026 -0.007 0.024 0.002 0.022
Observations
Groups
Log-Likelihood
U.K.
2997
575
-852.27-425.29 -675.24 -779.69 -493.72
2455
480
1693
347
1348
286
2169
451
Denmark France Germany Spain
Notes: Estimations are performed separately by country. Only time-varying covariates are identified. A Wald-test for the 
difference of the coefficients for the unemployed with and without benefits is significant only at the 10% level for 
Germany. 
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Table 7. Conditional Fixed Effect Logit Estimates by Sex
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Labor Market Status
Unemployed
   With Benefits 1.116 0.485 0.548 0.444 -0.262 0.274 0.930 0.330 -0.128 0.464
   Without Benefits 1.506 0.697 0.607 0.310 0.482 0.302 0.611 0.269 0.648 0.341
Observations
Groups
Log-Likelihood
Labor Market Status
Unemployed
   With Benefits 1.085 0.340 1.106 0.344 0.390 0.312 1.050 0.475 -0.202 0.825
   Without Benefits 0.397 0.566 1.110 0.247 0.501 0.263 1.063 0.259 0.378 0.414
Observations
Groups
Log-Likelihood
1484
282
-406.12
MALE
FEMALE
661.000 1124.000 1330.000 971
143.000
U.K.
1513
293
-443.67
230.000 258.000 201
687 1045 1125 722
-201.180 -348.170 -414.430
Denmark France Germany Spain
-288.58
-219.36 -321.22 -358.96 -201.74
143 221 222 146
Notes: Estimations are performed separately by country. Only time-varying covariates are identified. A Wald-test for the 
difference of the coefficients for the unemployed with and without benefits is significant only for males at the 10% level for 
Germany. 
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Table 8. Probit Estimates for Unemployed
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Labor Market Status
Unemployed
   Receiving Benefits 0.532 0.262 0.650 0.176 0.042 0.126 0.323 0.148 0.306 0.267
Education
   High Education 0.338 0.243 0.137 0.165 0.520 0.158 0.157 0.114 0.611 0.222
   Medium Education 0.270 0.199 -0.171 0.141 0.283 0.106 -0.048 0.105 0.551 0.247
Age Groups
   Age 20-24 1.082 0.382 0.713 0.232 0.620 0.167 0.614 0.202 1.680 0.431
   Age 25-29 0.966 0.340 0.433 0.229 0.615 0.154 0.812 0.192 1.230 0.447
   Age 30-44 0.454 0.308 0.211 0.219 0.388 0.144 0.482 0.188 0.709 0.443
Male 0.077 0.172 -0.016 0.129 0.094 0.089 0.115 0.088 0.127 0.184
Family Characteristics
   Married -0.896 0.410 -0.376 0.326 0.340 0.234 -1.417 0.230 -0.708 0.561
   No. of Kids 0.390 0.218 -0.048 0.156 -0.026 0.120 -0.111 0.124 0.418 0.240
Home Owner -0.328 0.312 0.511 0.257 -0.134 0.248 -0.052 0.177 0.461 0.330
Reg. Un Rate -0.034 0.068 -0.067 0.071 -0.043 0.026 0.058 0.029 0.022 0.037
Mean R. Benefits -0.860 0.399 -1.184 0.383 -1.032 0.656 -0.492 0.362 -1.041 0.661
Mean Married 0.430 0.430 0.385 0.341 0.603 0.604 1.399 0.241 0.707 0.608
Mean No. of Kids -0.244 0.230 -0.022 0.169 -0.687 0.281 0.068 0.130 -0.745 0.286
Mean Home Owner 0.181 0.367 -0.987 0.307 -0.994 0.400 -0.475 0.206 -1.042 0.401
Constant -2.347 0.679 -1.665 0.753 -2.425 0.314 -3.464 0.479 -4.648 0.789
Sigma 0.388 0.509 0.232 0.106 0.227 0.057 0.235 0.077 0.227 0.094
Observations
Groups
Log-Likelihood
U.K.
1500
1024
-137.58
Denmark France Germany Spain
1269 2813 6551 7681
783 1576 3133 4038
-170.50 -256.60 -526.70 -515.31
Notes: Estimations are performed for each country separately including regional and year dummies on the sample of the 
unemployed. The mean values are defined for the time-varying covariates. 
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Table 9. Predicted Probabilities from the CRE Probit Model
Denmark France Germany Spain U.K.
Predicted Probability at Mean 0.839 0.350 0.657 0.429 0.531
Values of Observed Characteristics
Reference Person 2.679 0.187 1.090 0.225 0.949
Labour Market Status
     Unemployed - Recipients 8.877 0.700 1.142 0.837 0.986
     Unemployed - Non-Recipients 6.213 0.490 2.157 0.520 1.957
Age Group 20-24 7.899 1.281 2.416 0.429 3.580
Age Group 25-29 4.291 0.490 1.897 0.567 1.951
Age Group 45+ 0.685 0.035 0.545 0.047 0.281
Education
   Third Level 2.762 0.490 1.224 0.297 0.982
   Lower Level 2.252 0.200 0.768 0.310 0.484
Single 3.564 0.353 0.876 2.862 1.366
Married
  With 1 Child 2.579 0.185 1.051 0.218 0.975
  With 2 Children 2.095 0.167 0.900 0.193 1.067
  With 3 Children 1.690 0.150 0.768 0.170 1.167
Home Owner 0.427 0.333 0.339 0.087 0.784
Female 2.569 0.133 0.911 0.157 0.899  
Note: The reference group is an employed, aged 30-44, single, without children, who lives in a rented house. 
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Table A1. Unemployment Benefits in Selected European Countries.
Schemes Employment/contributions conditions Payment rate Duration (months)
Denmark Insurance 52 weeks in 3 years 90% of reference earnings 1+3 years
France Insurance 4 months in last 18 months 40% to 57% decreasing at 4 4-60 months depending on age
monthly intervals
Germany Insurance 12 months in 3 years 60% of net earnings for singles and 67% with children 12-64 months depending on age and contribution history
Assistance Received UI during last year or being in need 53% of net earnings for single and 57% with children Unlimited - renewable every year
Spain Insurance 12 months in 6 years 70% of earnings in first 180 days and 60% afterwards 4-24 months depending on contribution history
U.K. Insurance Contributions paid in one of the 2 tax years Flat rate (65-83 Euros per week) depending on age 182 days
on which the claim is based amounting to at least 
25 times the minimun contribution for that year
Assistance Means Tested Flat rate (99-130 Euros per week) depending on age Unlimited
Source: European Commission Missoc 1994. 
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Table A2. Description of Variables
Labour Market Status
  Unemployed 
    Recipient
    Non-Recipient
Education Levels
  Higher level
  Medium level
  Lower level
Married
Home Ownership
Reg. Un. Rate Regional unemployment rate
Dummy for having finished second level of secondary education
Dummy for having finished less that second level of secondary education
Dummy for being married
Dummy for owning a house
Dummy equals 1 if unemployed and looking for a job, and 0 if employed
Dummy equals 1 if unemployed with benefits, and 0 if otherwise
Dummy equals 1 if unemployed without benefits, and 0 if otherwise
Dummy for having finished higher education
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